THE New Republic

Alexander Kendrick:

Moscow's Courtship of "Comrade Tito"

PAGE 14



Can the Republicans Pull Themselves Together?

JANUARY 10, 1955

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T. R. B.

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Washington Wire

The operators of the dozen motion picture cameras adjust their rubber earflaps. Big Hollywood spotlights pour down from galleries on the green carpet and silk brocade of the joint session of Congress, in the House of Representatives. We are waiting for Ike. Overhead is the saucer-shaped ceiling of the hall, made of stainless steel and sieved with millions of pinpoint holes for ventilation. Down below the Senators have just been announced in a bellow by the chief clerk. He is in good voice, and talks like the announcer of Grand Central Station. Any other parliament would put him in gold and velvet, or at least cutaway and striped pants. But the casual American democracy just lets him wear a business suit. Indeed, the only thing resembling costumes at the annual national ceremony are the page boys: they all wear blue serge. A few years back a sartorial shake-up occurred here, too; formerly they all wore knickers regardless of age, but now almost all of them seem to have switched to long pants.

The Senators walk, shamble, saunter, wobble or trot in, two by two, down the central aisle: what a variegated assortment they are! Everybody in the room applauds.

Next the ambassadors; everybody applauds again and cranes for the Communist countries. And now the big moment. The clerk gets a good breath, counts three, and yells: "Mr. Speaker—The President of the United States!"

What happens then always happens. There is good-natured applause as he comes down the aisle, then he mounts the podium the noise rises and swells and everybody joins in: it is a moment of mass emotionalism. Suddenly what they are applauding is not Ike, but the President of All the United States. It is a good moment. It is important in these rites.

As to what Ike says—this column is written before any of the events described, of course, and we can only guess. The State of the Union address is the point where a President can say anything he wants about anything he sees fit.

The important background fact is that this year marks the start of the 1956 election. Ike goes to bat first. Nothing very thrilling is likely. He speaks, and then Congress takes over. Ike has never shown any knack for that kind of leadership that gets a great new program, in a new direction, through Congress. We expect a more-of-the-same year, from a more-of-the-same Administration.

They are sending Dickey Nixon down to Latin America on a "goodwill" tour, but that isn't the real story at all. What the Administration is doing is to get the All American Boy out of town to improve relations with Democrats. It is a goodwill tour, all right in that sense, but as much as anything to improve the White House relations with the Congress.

Speaker Sam Rayburn threatens to refuse to sit down at the same table with Nixon who raised the Communist smear issue in the fall election. It's going to be hard for the Administration to know what to do with the Vice President in the next two Democratic years. A good deal of foreign travel is indicated.

The Wolf Ladejinsky loyalty case reduces everything about the security system to farce. It is so bizarre, so fantastic, so idiotic that it may well help the liberal side. Up to now the most incredible appointment, we think, of this millionaire-businessman Administration was America Firster, Clarence Manion. But now two officials over in Benson's Agriculture Department seem to take the cake, Milan D. Smith, the Secretary's executive assistant, and John G. Cassity, the security officer. Smith tried to justify the adverse ruling against Ladejinsky (after Scott McLeod, of all people, approved him) by citing a letter from a White Russian emigre which seemed to say, in effect, that you can't trust Russian Jews. As to Cassity, he offered the most amazing reasoning we have heard yet. He suspected Ladejinsky because he wrote anti-Communist articles. As the *NY Post* observed, that is not a misprint. The case against the "security risk" is even more sinister; as US Agricultural attache in Tokyo, the wretch even engaged in anti-Communist *actions*. "Those anti-Communist articles would have been enough to bother me," Cassity told a reporter, "when you consider this man had relatives in Russia." Obviously, Ladejinsky had the wink from Moscow.

Responsibility for this crazy performance rests on Eisenhower. Why is he silent? What is he doing? What did he do about McCarthy? Ike came to office to "clean up the mess in Washington." Oh, how we sometimes yearn for a little bit of that moral indignation of the old Truman order.

With under-employment on one hand and a raging stock-market boom on the other, the Administration isn't out of the economic woods yet. Economist Sumner Slichter wrote in the *Harvard Business School News*, December 17: "In this day and age it is difficult to understand such ill-conceived fiscal policies as have been practiced by the federal government during 1954."

We constantly marvel at the lack of US information about what goes on north of the border. Canada put its great new social-security benefit system for the permanently disabled into effect January 1. With a more flexible political system than ours, and with responsible parties, Canada's dollar has been at a premium over the American dollar, and almost every year she inaugurates social advances that would stagger FDR's New Deal. We deliberately turn our eyes away from Canada. Much better to ignore her, probably. Otherwise, who knows?—we might be tempted toward "socialism" too.

Correction: We mistakenly called "Editor's Syndicate," which distributes John Herling's excellent column, "Report on Labor," a "labor" syndicate. Actually it handles general features of all sorts to the daily press over the country. Sorry for the slip.

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BEHIND THE HEADLINES

Mild, Some Rain Likely

CONGRESS reconvenes in 1955 in the belief that divisions within the parties are likely to be more significant than divisions between the parties this year. The Republicans are deeply split on issues of trade, of taxation, of minimum wages, of farm policy and housing; all matters on which the President believes that his Administration must make a record before the 1956 campaign. On none of these issues, however, are the Democrats preparing to press the Republicans too far. For the Democrats also are sharply divided. Southerners have traditionally fought against minimum-wage legislation. Democrats from the coal areas have become high tariff men. The Texas leaders of the party, Lyndon Johnson and Sam Rayburn share the Republican commitment to shut out oil imports. Senators George and Bridges hold together that foreign economic aid shall not be large enough to disturb the budget. Revision of the security program, urgent as it is, has not yet become a winning political issue. Nor are the Democrats likely to challenge too far the wisdom of the soldier in the White House on the popular move of cutting back the armed forces and their appropriations. For Johnson, opposition and a program will take second place to party unity, in the hope Republicans will defeat themselves.

On one issue, however, a sharp fight is due which the President himself has precipitated. He has ordered the TVA directors to prepare a plan to make TVA independent of federal appropriations: he hopes to present it to Congress early this year. The proposal (outlined in the *NR* Dec. 27) will permit TVA to sell bonds to the public, backed perhaps by a federal guarantee.

In general terms the plan is supported by friends of TVA such as former Sen. John Sherman Cooper and Sen. Albert Gore. However, it can become a means of destroying the agency, and this undoubtedly will be the primary project of the powerful utility lobby for 1955. TVA supporters will work to secure the agency's right to sell bonds in the amount and time of its own choosing in the belief that this is vital to its efficient operation. Opponents of TVA will insist that Congress must authorize and thus limit every bond sale. By this means, as an editorial in the *Wall Street Journal* indicates, the Congress can hold down the construction of new steam plants needed for the valley. Then, as the *Journal* implies, pressure from the bondholders may succeed in breaking TVA's rate structure that serves as the yardstick for all utility rates.

Congress obviously will seek to protect its preferred position as investor of $1.9 billion in TVA. That, TVA supporters will argue, should be the extent of its interference if TVA like any other corporation is to finance its own future. The protection of the nation's investment lies, they will insist, not in prohibiting new financing but in preserving the health of the enterprise. That health, of course, is frightening to the extreme right. And so, around this issue, may develop a great practical and symbolic struggle over the heritage of the New Deal.

Secrecy in Science

AMERICA is in grave danger today partly because of an excessive or needless governmental program of "security" and secrecy in scientific matters. This was the practically unanimous verdict of hundreds of top American scientists meeting at the year's end in Berkeley, California, at the annual convention of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. "Espionage and sabotage, the communication of classified information to unauthorized persons, and infiltration by enemy agents and sympathizers must be guarded against," reported the Board of Directors of the AAAS. "No prudent government could take any other course." But such actions are wholly negative. "The basic fact is that there simply are no such things as permanent scientific secrets. The essential requirement is not secrecy but superiority. Superiority, however, can be achieved not by secrecy alone, but only by continued scientific progress."

The point was emphasized by Dr. Warren Weaver, president of the Association for 1955, in introducing Dr. Edward U. Condon, president for 1954, at a public meeting. Further testimony was offered by Dr. George W. Beadle of the California Institute of Technology, president of the Association for 1956. He said: "Any system effective enough to keep all our scientific knowledge out of the hands of potential enemies would have to be so elaborate and rigid that it would reduce communication among our own scientists to the point where scientific progress would stop."

Dr. Joel Hildebrand of the University of California, President-elect of the American Chemical Society, spoke of the fear influencing federal officials who try to placate witchhunting Congressmen. "That fear," he said, "has operated to withdraw support of research involving no question of security whatever, research that could yield results of great value in the relief of human suffering." Nash Candelaria, formerly of North American Aviation, gave a case history of how the system places almost insuperable obstacles in the way of efficient operation. A technical report may contain information, drawings and photographs from 15 or 20 different sources, some of them unrestricted, some semi-secret and some completely so. To avoid endless complications, the writer of the paper marks it all "secret," and thus reduces its practical value perhaps by 90 or 95 percent.

Scientists at Berkeley were frankly alarmed at the slowing down of American scientific progress at the moment when Russian progress is speeding up. The situation was well summed up by Dr. Vannevar Bush, president of the Carnegie Institution of Washington:

> In Russia today the scientist is respected and honored, too much so no

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doubt. In this country the scientist is under attack, viewed with suspicion; and young men hesitate to enter the profession or, once in, to participate in military programs because of the hazards to their reputations and careers. We had better reverse this trend if we wish to compete on even terms with the enemy.

There should be an end, for all who labor in the interests of the country's safety, of trial on the basis of unsupported charges, of actions by officials of government which destroy reputations, of the assumptions of guilt before trial. There should be a complete and final end of the use of the security system to discredit those who disagree. There should be a complete removal of the system from politics.

A vigorous system for throwing out the Communists in our midst must be paralleled by vigorous executive action to detect those actions which are inspired by spite or attempts at thought control, to see that they are suppressed before they do real damage, and see that they backfire promptly on those who instigate them. Finally, we need to learn that the use of star-chamber proceedings for political purposes is dangerous in the last degree to the very foundation of a democracy.

BRUCE BLIVEN

The Record of 1954

AS IN MOST years, the headlines in 1954 were devoted mainly to catastrophes—the collapse of EDC, the fall of Dien Bien Phu, and the appalling destructive power of the Hydrogen Bomb. Yet the year has been remarkable above all for construction.

In 1953, disintegration of Western unity was gathering a fearful momentum. No one any longer believed EDC would be ratified; yet there seemed to be no alternative except the "agonizing reappraisal" threatened by Mr. Dulles. The Trieste dispute looked like it would destroy the basis for Western policy in the Mediterranean, while in the Middle East progress was blocked by deadlocks over Persian oil and the Suez base. In the Far East the chasm between America's policy and that of her European allies was fast widening: the imminent debacle in Indo-China seemed likely to produce an ugly conflict in France itself and to face the West with the choice between atomic war and the loss of all Southeastern Asia. Above all, America's prestige had reached its lowest ebb in generations. McCarthy cast a long shadow abroad (longer than in his own country) while Republican foreign policy slogans terrified America's allies without disturbing Russia.

Today the picture is brighter than at any time since 1950. Through the London and Paris agreements the European governments have found an EDC alternative which in most ways is far superior. Britain's dramatic pledge to the Continent has provided the indispensable precondition for a Franco-German rapprochement. And under Mendès-France, France has shown that if the Assembly permits, she could justify the status which courtesy has accorded her since the war. The Trieste problem has found a solution which shows all signs of being final, and the Balkan Pact has removed a dangerous uncertainty which once weakened NATO's Southern flank.

The outlines of a new and stabler pattern in the Middle East are beginning to emerge. The Turkey-Pakistan Pact provides the piers for a bridge across the North of the area. By settling her disputes with Persia and Egypt, Britain has removed major obstacles to co-operation between the Middle Eastern states and the Western powers. But the consequent decline in Britain's local influence has left America carrying a responsibility which she has yet to recognize in full. In particular, a shift in the balance of power between Israel and the Arabs might well bring a new outbreak of war unless steps are rapidly taken to prevent this.

In Asia, too, the picture is clearer and more favorable than might have been expected a year ago—for the outcome of the war in Indo-China has been inevitable ever since France's disastrous political blunders in 1946 and 1947. The Geneva conference enabled the West to cut its losses with less loss of face than it would have suffered in the total military defeat which was the only alternative, and in the eyes of neutral Asia it committed China to pursue her aims in peace. The ensuing Manila Treaty did more good than harm, though little of either. More important is that Geneva produced a reappraisal of American Far Eastern policy and a shift of priority from military to economic and political defense diminishing the gulf between American and European views. More good has come from America's attempts to restrain Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek, in which the Formosa Treaty plays a useful role.

But it is wise to remember that in most cases the progress made in 1954 simply created conditions for solving problems rather than actually solving them. Germany's integration into the Western community has barely begun, and the French Assembly's recent votes show what obstacles are still to be surmounted. The NATO meeting in December underlines the contradictions inherent in Western policy about the military uses of atomic energy. It raises issues so stupendous that so far no government has dared to think them through.

London DENIS HEALEY, M.P.

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Washington Wire by T. R. B. 2
Behind the Headlines 3
The Ability to Choose 5
by Frank Gorrell
Can the Republicans Pull Themselves Together? 9
by Frederic W. Collins
Are We Condoning Union Tyranny? 12
by Ed Marciniak
Moscow's Courtship of Tito 14
by Alexander Kendrick
Books and Comment 17
Theatre 21
Correspondence 22

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Paris Dispatch THE ABILITY TO CHOOSE

Pierre-Mendes France has won a battle, certainly the most difficult, perhaps the most costly of his career. The National Assembly has at long last accepted the principle of West German rearmament. But the second house of the French parliament, the Council of the Republic, has still to agree. Under the recently adopted "little reform" of the Constitution the Council is no longer a wholly emasculate version of the prewar Senate. It now has the right to two months time in which to confirm or to alter or even to reject decisions of the Assembly. And this means, in effect, until March 11 because parliament reconvenes after a recess on January 11.

It also means, regardless of the ultimate result, more of the unedifying spectacle of a parliament and a people which can't make up their collective minds. Precisely the quality which Mendès-France puts highest in the order of political values (and necessities)—the ability to choose—is the one which the French seem to lack. The Hamletian tragedy of present-day France is that a majority of the French want both to keep the advantages of remaining in the Atlantic Alliance while at the same time hanging on to the advantages of keeping the West Germans disarmed.

Even Mendès-France, the most forthright and courageous statesman produced by the Fourth Republic, has never once dared to say that he, personally, favored German rearmament. He said only that the other Western powers, especially the US and Britain, insisted on such rearmament, indeed, made it a test of the Atlantic Alliance. Hence it was inevitable and had to be accepted as the lesser evil. An armed West Germany was less dangerous for France than a France moving toward isolation or remaining voiceless within the Atlantic Alliance. Mendès-France couldn't even come out bluntly and clearly as maintaining that Russia was a worse danger than a revived Germany. Naturally, therefore, less courageous men—which means most of the members of the Assembly—balked at going back to their constituencies marked with the brand of Cain—friends of German rearmament.



Forced into the position of trying to be all things to all men, Mendès-France was much less himself—a man who commanded admiration and respect. He won at the expense of further weakening his personal position. But in the process every single party in parliament, except the Communists, was also weakened. France emerged from the trial as divided politically, morally and psychologically as Germany is physically.

In the final analysis the reason for the Assembly's saying "yes" to German rearmament was the recognition that the "worst of all would be to say 'no' without having the means to procure respect for that 'no.'" If the vote is to mean anything, if France is to back up the "yes" in a manner that will retain for her authority and respect in the alliance, the task now is really to accept West German rearmament and at the same time to find the means of balancing increased German power. That is the heart of the matter.

Mendès-France confided in one of his friends that in his opinion the vote in the Assembly on West German rearmament, important as it was, amounted to an anti-climax. For it merely confirmed an even more important German "liberation toward greatness" which became inevitable the day the ceiling on West German steel production was removed. In 1954 West German steel production was 18 million tons compared with 15.5 million in 1953, far ahead of France (with the Saar) both in the total and in the rate of increase. The total value of exports rose from 18,500 million marks to a new postwar record of 22,100 million marks, an increase of about 20 percent. The value of exports in 1950 was only 8,400 million marks.

West German shipyards built and delivered 700,000 tons last year, an all-time record, 40 percent higher than the best prewar year. The North German Lloyd is back in the Atlantic, the Hamburg Amerika line in the Far East. The great Blohm and Voss shipyards are being rebuilt. The Lufthansa is soon to operate again. Here, too, there is no indication of the "competitive co-existence" between France and Germany which must precede effective co-operation; the French are far behind. Already the West German steel industry is again dominated by less than a dozen great combines. The rebuilding of the Ruhr industries, which were split up under Allied control, has begun. The first is the Mannesmann coal and steel combine. The High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community has given the company in Düsseldorf permission to re-absorb the Consolidation Coal Mining Company of Gelsenkirchen and the Stamag Steel Company in Düsseldorf. Other mergers are on their way; one now being prepared will give the Thyssen interests a yearly production capacity of 4 million tons of steel.

There are big French combines, too. And among their leaders are men who dream of great Franco-German cartels that could dominate continental European industry, face up to the British, and reduce the influence of America. The idea isn't new. Louis Loucheur and Theodore Laurent of France, Carl Bosch and Albert Vogler of Germany had it some 20 years ago. There are men close to Mendès-France who, while opposed to cartelism, see Franco-German economic co-operation as the key to a safe, prosperous and peaceful future for Western Europe.

The Premier himself insists that in such co-operation the French must be equals. But to make even a start toward equality with the Germans, the French must change their habits and attitudes. They cannot remain the most protected — economically speaking — people, and also compete effectively. German economic rearmament is a fact, perhaps the most significant one in Western Europe. German military rearmament may have the effect—temporarily at least—of slowing the steady rise to economic power—the British certainly have this in mind. It's up to the French to take advantage of the lull—to work as hard as the Germans. If Mendès-France survives as Premier, his next big battle is to make them do it.

Paris FRANK GORRELL

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Los Angeles: *The Death of the News*

The king-maker of the California Republican Party received a present this Christmas—one for which he had been waiting six long years. Norman Chandler, publisher of the *Los Angeles Times*, had founded the *Mirror* in 1948 with his chief target the Democratic *Daily News*. Eight days before Christmas, 1954, the name and circulation lists of the *Daily News* were sold to the Times-Mirror Company, bequeathing to Los Angeles the unenviable distinction of being the largest city in the United States with a one-party press.

The *Daily News* was founded in 1923 by Cornelius Vanderbilt Jr., son of the Commodore. It soon passed into receivership and thence into the control of Manchester Boddy who published the paper for 26 years. Old *Daily News* reporters recall that in 1932 the paper supported Hoover. In succeeding years it campaigned for Technocracy and Social Credit. The *News* then spoke for the supporters of the New Deal. As such it made money and rose in circulation to a high of 300,000—nearly twice the level at which it ceased publication.

When wartime controls ended, the *News* was hit hard by the increased costs of publishing. It sank back into the red in 1948 and lost $3 million in the next five years. From that time Boddy began losing interest in the *News*. Increasingly his time was taken up with flower-raising—until he became the world's largest camellia producer.

When Clinton D. McKinnon purchased the *News* from Robert Smith, Boddy's successor, it had lost $125,000 in the single month of December, 1953. McKinnon, a former Democratic Congressman, cut expenses. Advertising picked up. Organized labor worked to increase circulation and the *News*, once more an ardent Democratic paper, picked up 10,000 additional readers. The pressure of past debts, however, and a shortage of capital made its path impenetrable. In October, Robert K. Straus of New York, a member of the Macy department store family, took an option to purchase the *Daily News*. But failing to get matching capital on the West Coast, Straus gave up his option. One day later Chandler bought out the paper.

The AFL, which had sent paid workers out to get subscriptions for the *Daily News*, was especially bitter. One top official said that McKinnon "disgraced himself and betrayed those who worked to help the *Daily News* . . . by selling his subscription list to the Chandler interests." McKinnon replied that his failure to make a success of the paper was the fault of the Los Angeles unit of the American Newspaper Guild (CIO). It had been McKinnon's plan to merge the *News* with a profitable television station and thus to take advantage of tax credits. For this deal to be consummated it was necessary, however, that *News* employees waive their rights to $800,000 worth of severance pay. Uncertain what to do, the Guild referred the proposition to Loeb and Loeb, a highly respected Los Angeles law firm. Its recommendation was "that the Guild would be ill-advised to accept this proposal which destroys the possibility of collecting anything in the way of accrued severance pay." The Guild agreed.

In its December 27 issue *Newsweek* maintains that the Guild dealt the *News* its death blow, for: "Five days before the end the paper's ANG unit voted to strike . . . and this upset the applecart." The facts are that McKinnon had announced that he was unable to pay a week's retroactive wages due for almost nine months. The employees met in response but authorized only a succeeding meeting (which was never held) where a vote would have been taken on whether or not to strike. This, of course, is a common weapon—given by unions to aid their officers in negotiations with management.

Los Angeles naturally is talking of a new liberal newspaper. But can this city support five metropolitan dailies? Of the four which remain, only Chandler's *Times* is a money-maker. His *Mirror* has yet to finish a year in the black. And the two Hearst papers are happy if they break even. The problem is the same in Los Angeles as the rest of the country: rising publishing costs and increasing competition from suburban dailies. It is more serious here, for Los Angeles has always been spread out, with the result that many communities have their own well-established newspapers. In Los Angeles County (excluding Long Beach) there are 18 dailies with a total circulation of more than 300,000. And there are 86 weeklies.

For the present Los Angeles must look for news to the *Times* which has suppressed, expanded or manufactured the news according to its political impact. What will happen is indicated by the experience of the recent campaign. The race for Los Angeles state senator in 1954 was extremely close. And, typically, near the end of the campaign, the *Times* featured a story that Will Rogers Jr., a very popular leader in the California Democratic Party, had decided not to support the Democratic candidate. Rogers immediately issued a statement repudiating the story. He showed that the *Times* had tied together two statements that he had made six years apart. Similarly in the governorship race the incumbent Republican Goodwin Knight was spread over the front page of the *Times* whenever he opened his mouth. His opponent, Richard Graves, had to be content with a two or three paragraph summary of his speeches in the political column on the back pages. A characteristic story occurred over the smog. Both Knight and Graves had agreed on one issue: Los Angeles smog must go, and each was rivaling the other in promises to eliminate it. Knight, in a move to top all others, made a dramatic plea to the oil refineries, one of the chief smog producers, to shut down. The refineries refused. Graves, who had been a lobbyist for a group representing California city governments, pointed out that Knight had the power not merely to beg, but to order the refineries to close. "I ought to know," Graves added, "for I helped write the law." It was a telling and newsworthy blow by Graves, but voters knew of Graves' statement only if they read the *Daily News*.

On the corpse of the *News*, a weird dance is now taking place. Chandler's tabloid, renamed the *Mirror and Daily News*, is fighting it out with Hearst's *Examiner* for the former *Daily News* subscribers. For although Chandler received complete lists of subscribers in the sale, the *Examiner* was one jump ahead. When it first heard of the sale the *Examiner* set its carrier boys to work contacting as many of the *Daily News* carriers as possible. In reply in an appeal to the former *Daily News* subscribers, the *Mirror* is boasting of its political and financial independence. The policy of the *Mirror*, says Mr. Chandler, "will be a liberal and progressive one just as it has always been."

BILL CARPENTER

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Narrowness, Loneliness and Love

by J. Robert Oppenheimer

Director of the Institute of Advanced Studies, Princeton University, Dr. Oppenheimer presented the views printed here in an address *Prospects in the Arts and Sciences* which closed Columbia University's Bicentennial Celebration.

In any science there is harmony between practitioners. A man may work as an individual, learning of what his colleagues do through reading or conversation; or he may be working as a member of a group on problems whose technical equipment is too massive for individual effort. But whether he is part of a team or solitary in his own study, he, as a professional, is a member of a community.

His colleagues in his own branch of science will be grateful to him for the inventive or creative thoughts he has, will welcome his criticism. His world and work will be objectively communicable and he will be quite sure that, if there is error in it, that error will not long be undetected. In his own line of work he lives in a community where common understanding combines with common purpose and interest to bind men together both in freedom and in cooperation.

This experience will make him acutely aware of how limited, how inadequate, how precious is this condition of his life; for in his relations with a wider society there will be neither the sense of community nor of objective understanding. He will sometimes find, it is true, in returning to practical undertakings, some sense of community with men who are not expert in his science, with other scientists whose work is remote from his, and with men of action and men of art.

The frontiers of science are separated now by long years of study, by specialized vocabularies, arts, techniques and knowledge, from the common heritage even of a most civilized society, and anyone working at the frontier of such science is in that sense a very long way from home and a long way, too, from the practical arts that were its matrix and origin, as indeed they were of what we today call art.

The specialization of science is an inevitable accompaniment of progress; yet it is full of dangers, and it is cruelly wasteful, since so much that is beautiful and enlightening is cut off from most of the world. Thus it is proper to the role of the scientist that he not merely find new truth and communicate it to his fellows, but that he teach, that he try to bring the most honest and intelligible account of new knowledge to all who will try to learn.

This is one reason—it is the decisive organic reason—why scientists belong in universities. It is one reason why the patronage of science by and through universities is its most proper form; for it is here, in teaching, in the association of scholars, and in the friendships of teachers and taught, of men who by profession must themselves be both teachers and taught, that the narrowness of scientific life can best be moderated and that the analogies, insights and harmonies of scientific discovery can find their way into the wider life of man.

In the situation of the artist today there are both analogies and differences to that of the scientist; but it is the differences which are the most striking and which raise the problems that touch most on the evil of our day.

For the artist it is not enough that he communicate with others who are expert in his own art.

The artist depends on a common sensibility and culture, on a common meaning of symbols, on a community of experience and common ways of describing and interpreting it. He need not write for everyone or paint or play for everyone. But his audience must be man; it must be man, and not a specialized set of experts among his fellows.

Today that is very difficult. Often the artist has an aching sense of great loneliness, for the community to which he addresses himself is largely not there; the traditions and the history, the myths and the common experience, which it is his function to illuminate and to harmonize and to portray, have been dissolved in a changing world.

There is, it is true, an artificial audience maintained to moderate between the artist and the world for which he works: the audience of the professional critics, popularizers and advertisers of art. But though, as does the popularizer and promoter of science, the critic fulfills a necessary present function, and introduces some order and some communication between the artist and the world, he cannot add to the intimacy and the directness and the depth with which the artist addresses his fellow men.

To the artist's loneliness there is a complementary great and terrible barrenness in the lives of men. They are deprived of the illumination, the light and the tenderness and insight of an intelligible interpretation, in contemporary terms, of the sorrows and wonders and gaities and follies of man's life.

This may be in part offset, and is, by the great growth of technical means for making the art of the past available. But these provide a record of past intimacies between art and life; even when they are applied to the writing and painting and composing of the day, they do not bridge the gulf between a society too vast and too disordered, and the artist trying to give meaning and beauty to its parts.

In an important sense, this world of ours is a new world, in which the unity of knowledge, the nature of human communities, the order of society, the order of ideas, the very notions of society and culture have changed, and will not return to what they have been in the past. What is new is new not because it has never been there before, but because it has changed in quality.

One thing that is new is the prevalence of newness, the changing scale and scope of change itself, so that the world alters as we walk in it, so that the years of man's life measure not some small growth or rearrangement or moderation of what he learned in childhood, but a great upheaval.

What is new is that in one generation our knowledge of the natural world engulfs, upsets and complements all knowledge of the natural world before. The techniques, among which and by which we live, multiply and ramify, so

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that the whole world is bound together by communication, blocked here and there by the immense synapses of political tyranny.

The global quality of the world is new: our knowledge of and sympathy with remote and diverse peoples, our involvement with them in practical terms and our commitment to them in terms of brotherhood. What is new in the world is the massive character of the dissolution and corruption of authority, in belief, in ritual and in temporal order.

Yet this is the world that we have come to live in. The very difficulties which it presents derive from growth in understanding, in skill, in power. To assail the changes that have unmoored us from the past is futile, and, in a deep sense, I think it is wicked. We need to recognize the change and learn what resources we have. . . .

The superhighways do not help. They are the mass media—from the loud speakers in the deserts of Asia Minor and the cities of Communist China to the organized professional theatre of Broadway. They are the purveyors of art and science and culture for the millions upon millions—the promoters who represent humanity to the arts and sciences; they are the means by which we are reminded of the famine in remote places or of war or trouble or change; they are the means by which this great earth and its peoples have become one to another, the means by which the news of discovery or honor, and the stories and songs of today travel and resound throughout the world.

But they are also the means by which the true human community, the man knowing man, the neighbor understanding neighbor, the schoolboy learning a poem, the women dancing, the individual curiosity, the individual sense of beauty are being blown dry and issueless, the means by which the passivity of the disengaged spectator presents to the man of art and science the bleak face of unhumanity.

For the truth is that this is indeed inevitably and increasingly an open, and inevitably and increasingly an eclectic world. We know too much for one man to know much, we live too variously to live as one. Our histories and traditions . . . are both bonds and barriers among us. Our knowledge separates as well as it unites; our orders disintegrate as well as bind; our art brings us together and sets us apart. The artist's loneliness, the scholar's despairing, because no one will any longer trouble to learn what he can teach, the narrowness of the scientist, these are not unnatural insignia in this great time of change.

For what is asked of us is not easy. The openness of this world derives its character from the irreversibility of learning; what is once learned is part of human life. We cannot close our minds to discovery, we cannot stop our ears so that the voices of far off and strange people can no longer reach them. The great cultures of the East cannot be walled off from ours by impassable seas and defects of understanding based on ignorance and unfamiliarity. Neither our integrity as men of learning nor our humanity allows that. In this open world what is there any man may try to learn?

This is no new problem. There has always been more to know than one man could know; there has always been a mode of feeling, many modes of feeling, that could not move the same heart; there have always been deeply held beliefs that could not be composed into a synthetic union.

Yet never before today has the diversity, the complexity, the richness so clearly defied hierarchical order and simplification, never before have we had to understand the complementary, mutually not compatible ways of life, and recognize choice between them as the only course of freedom.

Never before today has the integrity of the intimate, the detailed, the true art, the integrity of craftsmanship and the preservation of what is familiar, humorous and beautiful stood in more massive contrast to the vastness of life, the greatness of the globe, the otherness of people, the otherness of ways and the all-encompassing dark.

This is a world in which each of us, knowing his limitations, knowing the evils of superficiality and the terrors of fatigue, will have to cling to what is close to him, to what he knows, to what he can do, to his friends and his tradition and his love, lest he be dissolved in a universal conclusion and know nothing and love nothing. It is at the same time a world in which none of us can find hieratic prescription or general sanction for any ignorance, any insensitivity, any indifference.

When a friend tells of a new discovery, we may not understand, we may not be able to listen without jeopardizing the work that is ours and closer to us but we cannot find in a book or canon—and we should not seek—grounds for hallowing our ignorance. If a man tells us that he sees differently, or that he finds beautiful what we find ugly, we may have to leave the room, from fatigue or trouble; but that is our weakness and our default.

If we must live with a perpetual sense that the world and the men in it are greater than we and too much for us, let it be the measure of our virtue that the limits of our powers correspond to some special wisdom in our choice of life, of learning or of beauty.

This balance—this perpetual, precarious, impossible balance between the infinitely open and the intimate, this time—our twentieth century—has been long in coming; but it has come. It is, I think, for us and our children, the only way.

This is for all men. For the artist and for the scientist there is a special problem and a special hope, for in their extraordinarily different ways, in their lives that have increasingly divergent character, there is still a sensed bond, a sensed analogy.

Both the man of science and the man of art live always at the edge of mystery, surrounded by it; both always, as the measure of their creation, have had to do with the harmonization of what is new and what is familiar, with the balance between novelty and synthesis, with the struggle to make partial order in total chaos.

They can, in their work, and in their lives help themselves, help one another and help all men. They can make the paths that connect the villages of arts and sciences with each other, and with the world at large, the multiple, varied, precious bonds of a true and worldwide community.

This cannot be an easy life. We shall have a rugged time of it to keep our minds open and to keep them deep, to keep our sense of beauty and our ability to make it, and our occasional ability to see it, in places remote and strange and unfamiliar; we shall have a rugged time of it, all of us, in keeping these gardens in our villages, in keeping open the manifold, intricate, casual paths, to keep these flourishing in a great open windy world; but this is, as I see it, the condition of man; and in this condition we can help, because we can love, one another.

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

Can the Republicans Pull Themselves Together?

by Frederic W. Collins

THE MORE one studies the Republican Party today, the more one realizes it isn't there any more. It seems to occupy the Presidency, but the President is not a man of party spirit. It has a right-wing, but the rest of the structure is not apparent. It has delegations in Congress, but they have meaning only insofar as they can coalesce with Democrats in something called bipartisanship. It is reluctant to have issues. The questioner feels the animal over and finds that the body has the shape of an elephant, certainly smells like an elephant, but his fingers grope in vain for skeleton, flesh and muscle. There are remnants here of possible interest to the paleontologist, there is enough of a container to interest a taxidermist, but it is doubtful whether there is life and spirit enough to carry it through the parade.

The party has been through a series of crises. One, lasting 25 years, left a doubt as to whether it could ever enjoy a majority popularity. Another was the recent campaign, in which the answer given seemed to be "No."

There has been the meaningful division between Mr. Eisenhower and the so-called party leader in the Senate, Mr. Knowland, on what is, stated simply, an issue of peace or war. There has been the open break between the President and Senator McCarthy on the issue of common decency in politics; it appears the President won only because decency still inheres in the electorate, and because to most of his party the President still looks like the best candidate for 1956.

Finally, there has been the struggle to subdue the brutal realities of the national crisis by co-operation between the parties, not only in foreign affairs but in domestic affairs bearing on defense and security.

It is, of course, impossible to suppose that at the next renewal, the animal will not get up and go through all the pretensions of being itself. But at present it has not an identity which can command the admiration of a majority of the populace; it can fulfill its destiny of government only by allying itself with an opposition; its motor senses are impaired and its capacity for locomotion is unproven; many of its members are either atrophied or unresponsive to a summons from the brain; and when it once more lumbers down Main Street it may wear only borrowed spangles.

When looking at the results of the November Congressional elections, public attention was concentrated on the box score of results for Senate, House and Governorships. Less noticed was the disappearance of the components of political power by which the Republican Party in recent years has been nominating candidates at least able to challenge the Democratic candidates, and at last, in 1952, to win. The 1954 results even raise a question as to whether the Republicans could win in 1956 with their 1952 victor.

Since 1932, the Republicans have always nominated someone to the left of themselves. That holds true even for Alf Landon, and truer for the later years in which some men in the party, at least, began to get a clearer picture of the problem confronting the persistently minority GOP.

These nominations were accomplished, and indeed had to be accomplished, by the manipulation of great power blocs within the party, and the agglomeration with them of lesser but still sizeable chunks of party power. This manipulation was the work of Easterners, liberal and internationalist by comparison with other factions in the party. In the last election the elements of power which they had previously brought together into convention majorities either disappeared or became less susceptible of management.

The most noteworthy and conspicuous example, of course, is New York. There, Thomas E. Dewey, commander of the single largest power unit in a Republican national convention, decided at last to retire from the Governorship and resume private life. He did not intend, however, that his control of this unit should be

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interrupted. He chose Sen. Irving M. Ives to run for Governor and to become executor (with such advice and consent as Dewey might offer) of the control of the New York Republican organization.

Something went wrong: Ives was permitted to remain in the Senate. It is demonstrable as a general rule that a Senator sitting in Washington cannot successfuly direct the affairs of a party organization back home. Almost the only way it can be done is when the Governor is a creature of the Senator, and even then, Governors are given to fits of independence. Ives does not even have a Governor to work through, and has the added handicap of being a Senator who couldn't win the Governorship. On the chart, the leader of the Republican Party in New York today is Attorney General Jacob M. Javits. For all his admirable characteristics, he is not a natural successor to Tom Dewey as the boss of New York Republicans, and he lacks the apparatus for carrying out that role even if nature had endowed him for it.

In Pennsylvania, it is doubtful whether there is now to be found the nucleus of party control. This year the organization thought it could win simply by being the organization. The State House thereupon passed to the control of George M. Leader, Democrat. Governor John S. Fine, at whose feet so many offerings were laid by the Eisenhower managers in the pre-1952 convention days has proceeded to well-earned oblivion. The remnants of the Owlett-Grundy machine have achieved the ultimate in remnanthood. Senator Duff and Senator Martin sit obscurely in Washington. Even today, the adherents of 1956 hopefuls must be asking themselves who there is in Pennsylvania to make a deal with.

California, ranking with Pennsylvania in importance, presents a comparable problem, but for different and more interesting reasons. In an excess of idealism or optimism, the Eisenhower Administration deprived itself there of the dominant Republican figure by making him Chief Justice of the United States. He is now even more remote from control than he would be as a Senator.

Analysts of the California problem have a feeling that Governor Goodwin J. Knight, having now won a four-year term, will come as close as anyone to controlling the California delegation in 1956. The question left is who can control, or influence, Knight. Excursions into prophecy about California politics are always risky. It can be said that Knight owes nothing to President Eisenhower or to the people who might have to try to pick someone like him in 1956. It can be said that Senator Knowland and Senator Kuchel played successfully with Knight in defeating Vice President Nixon in an intra-party fight in California this fall. It is widely believed, though not proved beyond all reasonable doubt, that Nixon and Knowland are implacable political rivals. In the end, California's role may be settled by interests out of sight, the industrial, agricultural, railroad, and oil figures—to name a few categories of butters-in—who for reasons perhaps of pure altruism take such a lively interest in California Republican business.

Ohio Republican affairs will remain in the hands of the trustees of the political estate of Robert A. Taft unless the will is contested by Senator Bricker. In Illinois, it will be necessary to determine whether Governor Stratton (rather badly discredited after the Paul Douglas re-election) or the great anti-me-tooer, Everett Dirksen, is the man to dicker with.

To get the little ones, it helps to have the big ones. If that can't be arranged, it helps to get combinations of little ones. That is more difficult. Governor McKeldin, of Maryland, who nominated Mr. Eisenhower in 1952, is still there. Driscoll is gone in New Jersey. A Democrat rules the State House in Minnesota. The Republicans of Connecticut are disorganized. In Delaware, they suffered a defeat far more significant than the returns showed. Postmaster General Arthur Summerfield can repeat his profitable hard-to-get act in Michigan only by remote control.

The one sure characteristic of the 1956 game, if Mr. Eisenhower should not run again, is that any number can play. This does not mean Republicans, in such an event, could not nominate a candidate. It does mean, because of the geographical and ideological distribution of the few remaining components of power, that they would have a much more difficult time choosing a candidate who could give a good Democrat a hard time—a candidate who could be attractive to the majority while representing a party persistent in making itself attractive to only a minority.

For that matter, even the right wing, which seems to hold most of the realities of political power, is a shifting and evanescent quantity. For a fleeting moment, after the votes on the McCarthy censure issue had been counted in the Senate, it seemed possible to recite the boundaries of the Republican Right and name its principal physical features. Then McCarthy, attacking the President on December 7, went too far even for many of those who had already gone too far with him, and the definable limits of the Right contracted overnight.

As to the party's prospects of re-electing Mr. Eisenhower in 1956: David Lawrence and the *Democratic Digest* are in agreement that the November returns show the Democrats would have elected a President had the office been at stake.

The *Digest's* analysis was based on incomplete returns, which would only have been more heavily Democratic had they been complete. The popular votes in the House races, as translated into electoral votes, says the *Digest*, would have given the Democrats 26 states having a total of 317 electoral votes, and the Republicans 22 states, with 214 electoral votes.

Mr. Eisenhower was not running for re-election, although he was certainly running for something. By-elections are elections in which the voters can register

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dissatisfaction with the government while stopping short of unseating it. Mr. Eisenhower ran ahead of the Republican Congressional field in 1952. It is not fair to say he would have been defeated this year, and this year's results do not mean he would be defeated in 1956. It would be dull of the Republicans, however, not to take heed of portents on which both Mr. Lawrence and the *Democratic Digest* can agree.

BIPARTISANSHIP, as a knowing Republican politician once remarked, is a fine thing—between elections. If it is carried to the extremes to which President Eisenhower now wishes to carry it, with the Democratic leadership for the moment seeming to agree, the result can only be the frustration of the party spirit in the country. In the area of foreign affairs it has become acceptable. Its applicability in domestic affairs is of the most limited sort.

A useful text is to be found in a perceptive passage of George Dangerfield's *The Era of Good Feelings*, in which he says:

> The truth was that in 1823 and 1824, Americans did not know to what kind of political thinking their destiny was to be committed. They saw only that Monroe's period of service was coming to an end without offering to the electorate the solace of an issue, a platform, a party cry—those necessary lubricants of a political democracy. Monroe, who hated party spirit, and who thought of himself as everybody's President, was the last man to do so.

The parallelism with today is too obvious to be labored. It has been said of Mr. Eisenhower that on one issue he is determined to make over the Republican Party in his own image: foreign trade policy, as symbolized by the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act. This is sometimes regarded as a foreign policy issue, but it is at least equally a domestic issue.

In pressing this program, Mr. Eisenhower will have "bipartisan" support. It is a foregone conclusion, however, that if he is able to put it over, it will be only because of a generous helping—probably the largest portion—of Democratic votes. In the end, Mr. Eisenhower may have his way, but it is doubtful whether he can prove that as the result he has made the Republican Party over in his own image. Rather, Democrats may say they have made him over into their image—or accepted him as part of it.

This is not to deny Mr. Eisenhower plaudits for his attitude. It is to illustrate Republican difficulty in finding issues upon which the party can present to voters nationally a clear proof of superior virtue.

Mr. Eisenhower will have the same difficulty with respect to social security expansion, lifting of the minimum wage, and other programs in the field of "welfare."

The real definition between this Republican Administration and modern Democratic Administration lies in the area of government economic intervention on behalf of the individual. The Democratic impulse is to make this intervention direct. The Republican experiment now being conducted is to make it indirect, to apply it at the sources of the economy. The Democratic way has a vastly greater political appeal, because being direct, it makes itself more clearly felt. The Republican way has minimum political appeal; in addition to being indirect, it has still to prove itself. Additionally, Republicans have continued difficulties because the exigencies of national security postpone the day of the balanced budget and of a fiscal policy so nourishing to the sources of the economy that every last citizen can apply his lips to the ultimate spigot and drink hearty.

Mr. Eisenhower may call himself a progressive moderate or a moderate progressive (he has used both terms), but by comparison, and by reason of the make-up of his party, his must inevitably be classed as a conservative government. Reiteration of the word "dynamic" from now until eternity will not make it plausible. It is one of the difficulties of a conservative government that it cannot invent and adventure. By nature, too, it must be on the defensive. The Republican Party under Eisenhower is even now under suspicion of being dominated by big business. The Democrats' "giveaway" cry was a telling one in the fall campaign.

In his present situation, the President can make his party look like something different only by whipping up majorities within it for a program he can successfully present as a new kind of Eisenhower Republicanism. In the difficult tests, the ones where he is really bucking the ancient habits of the party, he could do that only through an effective leadership. He lacks that too. In the House, the competent Martin-Halleck combination will continue to be with him, but out of power. In the Senate, Knowland appears to be trying to make himself into a new Taft—but to the right of Taft. Nothing Knowland has said or done indicates he intends to be the Administration's floor leader.

THE whole membership of the Republican delegation in the Senate can be scanned without discovering anyone who looks like an able and influential "Eisenhower leader." So many have looked so good and have turned out so bad that it is folly to pin any hopes on the new candidate, Senator Case, of New Jersey. It takes political finesse as well as good will to do the job, and however good his will may now be, Case did not prove himself to be a leader in the House.

The Republican Party is composed of a group on the right which appears to have no interest in giving it majority appeal, and of a man in the White House who wants to give it majority appeal but has few helpers, few techniques, and few opportunities. He survived handsomely, in 1952, the allegation that he could not rise above his party. Next time around, the question will be when are they going to get together, and, politically, where.

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Are We Condoning Union Tyranny?

by Ed Marciniak

THERE is a standard reply of union officials to questions about union corruption and mismanaged welfare funds. It runs about like this: "Well, after all, union officials are human like everybody else; you will find crooks among bankers, lawyers and college presidents; the union percentage is no worse than the rest."

But those genuinely concerned about reports of union venality deserve something better than this sort of brush-off. Liberals in particular need information if they are to help interpret sympathetically the present position of unionism to the larger group of less friendly Americans. And organized labor needs the liberals' help if it is to answer its opponents effectively.

The *Baltimore Sun's* recent editorial ("On Condoning Tyranny") in its September 26 issue was typical of recent attacks. Capitalizing on acknowledged instances of union dishonesty, the editorial censured young people for their apathy to labor monopolies (which the *Sun's* editorialist says employers are powerless to oppose), and to a new race of robber barons who plunder the welfare funds of workingmen.

I suggest that the *Sun's* editor has mistaken "indifference" for disillusionment. For without exception labor editors and union educational directors report that the flood of college students who came to union offices during the 1940's in search of a job has turned into a trickle. Why is this so?

The reasons are complex, but they are not the ones implied by the *Sun*. Continued prosperity since the end of World War II, for one thing, has produced students who are, by and large, more business-minded than their predecessors. Commerce school enrollment has multiplied faster than rabbits. A generation of young people whose social conscience had not been sharpened by depression has been confronted by serious accusations against the labor movement, and there were facts to give plausibility to the accusations. With little to help them appreciate that cases of union corruption were in the minority, many young people *have* become disillusioned with (rather than "indifferent" to) trade unionism.

It is not hard to see how this disillusionment has come about. Gangster domination of waterfront unions in New York was an established fact; so was the indictment of union officials for shaking down Midwestern contractors; so was the Chicago union official who admitted early this year that his insurance brokers had donated $42,000 to help sponsor a girls' baseball team which he owned.

Some union presidents have acted and talked like corporation executives. ("I run the union just like a business. We deal in one commodity—labor," once explained Dave Beck, president of the Teamsters' union.) Others, by word and deed, have behaved as if the union were their personal property.

A few union leaders, following the example of the *nouveau riche*, joined the best country clubs and got reserved seats on winter excursions to Florida beaches. Some hired a literary hack to write their biographies arrogantly stuffed with Homeric adjectives.

Some unions continued to display an abominable lethargy about racial discrimination. (One union, for example, agreed last September to abandon its "white male" clause, but only in those jurisdictions with FEPC laws!)

Incidents like these were not likely to inspire a romantic urge in young people to devote themselves to the labor movement. The thousands who were attracted to the CIO in the 1930's came looking not for an easy way to make a fast buck, but for a life vocation of service to their fellow men. For them, unions were the underdogs, whose officials were jailed regularly, tarred and feathered, blacklisted and even murdered. They wanted to identify themselves with a cause in which the professional pork chopper played a secondary role. They came, touched by some of that mystique which set aflame the native radicalism of the Knights of Labor and the Industrial Workers of the World: an injury to one was an injury to all and only through the solidarity of a union could workers obtain justice in the American economy.

But even the events *within* the labor movement were

"ONE OF THE distressing phenomena of the present time," said the *Baltimore Sun* in a recent 1500-word editorial, "is the relative indifference of thoughtful young people to the excesses of many labor unions." Dare anyone argue, the *Sun* wrote, "that many labor leaders are not active and powerful tyrants"? Is it not true that "of all the organized groups in the country, the labor unions through their bosses, now exert the greatest political and economic power?"

The editorial found it "puzzling" that the young men and women of today "seem to be oblivious of or indifferent to the new monopoly and the new tyranny right under their noses."

Ed Marciniak, whose reflections on the *Sun* statement appear here, is the editor of the independent labor paper *Work*, published in Chicago by the Catholic Labor Alliance.

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not the principal reasons for the estrangement of many young people. Republican campaigns to split the rank and file away from their "labor bosses" influenced many. The media of mass communications, with few, but notable, exceptions, failed to interpret organized labor's contributions to the nation. How often were unions given credit for their battle against Communism in the labor movement—waged long before the McCarthy era? How often did the daily press, so vigilant about safeguarding freedom of speech, defend freedom of association? Even the few movies about unions, *Whistle at Eaton Falls* or *On the Waterfront*, were not the kind to excite interest in the opportunities for adventure and service in union ranks.

TRYING to estimate the extent of union power in the United States is as tricky as manipulating UNIVAC. But the facts do not support generalizations like those in the *Sun,* or the one made in December by Henry G. Riter, 3rd, newly-elected president of the National Association of Manufacturers. Organized labor, Riter argued, has "acquired an economic and political power which outweighs that of any other segment of our economy."

Have unions actually been as powerful as Riter, the *Baltimore Sun* and others charge? For over seven years, unions have unsuccessfully been trying to get new labor legislation passed to replace the Taft-Hartley law; their early demand for absolute repeal has now been replaced by a willingness to accept substantial amendments. Since 1947, 17 states have passed "right to work" laws—over the militant but ineffective opposition of unions. Workmen's compensation benefits are almost without exception pegged to living standards at a starvation level. In some states, as an under-secretary of labor in the Eisenhower Administration himself pointed out, a man totally disabled at 22 gets small weekly payments until 30 and not a nickel thereafter. The combined assets of all labor unions are still less than those of one corporation giant like AT&T or Metropolitan Life. Ten times as many businessmen as unionists sit in Congress. Only 84 labor leaders were regarded important enough to be included in the 1950-51 edition of *Who's Who.*

The strength of organized labor is exaggerated by its enemies for the same reason that professional anti-Communists inflate the size of the Red menace in the US—to exploit fear and confusion for private gain.

Attempts to magnify the real power of labor rest upon an assumption that such an acquisition of power by workingmen and their leaders is somehow repugnant to American democracy. How can any citizen conscientiously object to labor's exerting an important and decisive influence in national affairs—provided that power is democratically determined and used for the common good?

Without excusing featherbedding in show business or apologizing for artificial jurisdictions that harass the building trades, we may fairly say that the charge of labor monopoly is fraudulent. Government regulation of "labor monopolies" is advocated by those who consider labor a commodity. They would reverse the principle written into the Clayton Act of 1914: that labor is not a commodity but the human activity of free men. Our anti-trust statutes were intended to protect competition among business enterprises which either manufacture or sell commodities. Unions conduct no such business. It was on this principle that the late Sen. Robert A. Taft successfully held off his colleagues in the 80th Congress who wanted unions subject to anti-trust laws. That principle today is being upheld in the Eisenhower Cabinet by Secretary of Labor James P. Mitchell who is fighting off a similar proposal from the Commerce Department.

Furthermore, legal curbs on trusts are aimed at unilateral, monopolistic practices in US business. But the normal activities of a union—wages, hours and working conditions—are carried on through *negotiation* between the union and employer. Where unions go afield to conspire with employers or other organizations to freeze out retailers or fix prices, they are subject to anti-trust laws.

The mushrooming of health and welfare plans after World War II found local union officials generally unprepared to manage large amounts of money with bank-like scrupulousness. Organizing and negotiating experience was not an automatic guarantee of honest housekeeping of million dollar funds. On top of it all, the business agent was tempted by fat commissions on insurance. The greedy and thoughtless ones took the money at a time when there was no over-all union policy to guide them. Today it is clear that a union official is not entitled to one cent of personal profit on insurance which he secures for his union members. Commissions belong to the workers.

WHENEVER welfare funds were abused, union officials had to rely on employers as their silent partners in crime. At the insistence of management, the Taft-Hartley law provided for the joint administration of union-negotiated welfare programs. But not all employer trustees exercised their share of this stewardship. Referring to one of the worst cases of fund management, a New York state investigating committee reported this year that "this situation could not have prevailed save for the indifference of the trustee representing the employers."

The necessity of employer collusion applies to other instances of union tyranny. The leadership of a large union in Chicago eliminates any rank-and-file opposition by persuading the employer to fire the rebels. And the employer, enjoying an easy contract with the union, is willing to connive. The labor relations head of a multi-million dollar company in the Midwest admitted to me that during the war years his firm was frequently asked to discharge employees challenging the Communist control of the union. To keep peace with the Communists, the boss obliged.

Ever since 1908 when a representative of the National

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Association of Manufacturers tried to bribe Samuel Gompers, then president of the American Federation of Labor, into retirement, employers have tried to seduce union leaders with rewards of money or advancement. Investigations would reveal, I am certain, that 100 bribes were proferred for every one accepted. My purpose in establishing the role of employers in union tyranny is not to exonerate any union officer who chisels workingmen of their welfare dollars. The fact is that fewer bribes would be given, and even fewer taken, if employer actions in this area were subject to the same scrutiny by radio, press, and TV as are the acts of union leaders.

The most hopeful indication that the labor movement has not lost its original vitality is the way top AFL and CIO leaders have refused in recent years to pussy-foot with evidences of corruption in their affiliated international unions. Upsetting a string of precedents about "autonomy," AFL President George Meany steamed into the port of New York and cut Joe Ryan's hoodlum union adrift from the AFL. Meany also led the move at the last AFL convention to get AFL unions to cooperate with government investigations of health and welfare funds. "A 99 percent record is not enough," Meany said. "This is sacred money that belongs to these members and doesn't belong to the union or anyone else connected with the union."

David Dubinsky, president of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (AFL), voiced a new union sentiment when he recognized the role of government in policing welfare funds. "In the face of the evil that does exist," Dubinsky said, "we must begin to think about lending our support to legislation that may call for publication of the financial facts about welfare funds . . . or that may set a minimum code of propriety and responsibility for the handling of these funds." His views were promptly published in full in the AFL's official monthly, *The American Federationist.*

When the New York state investigating committee uncovered mismanagement of welfare funds in a CIO union, Walter Reuther, CIO president, immediately demanded that the union clean house fast or face expulsion. And the union complied.

Moscow's Courtship of Tito

by Alexander Kendrick

THE DIPLOMATIC toast of the year, glasses raised by Soviet Premier Malenkov and Foreign Minister Molotov to "Comrade Tito" and the Yugoslav Communist Party on the Yugoslav national holiday, reverberated throughout the world—but was not reported in the Soviet Union itself.

Except for such accounts as the Voice of America and other Western transmitters could filter through the electronic curtain of constant Soviet jamming, the Russian people knew only that the top Kremlin brass had for the first time in seven years attended the annual reception at the Yugoslav embassy in Moscow.

This was significant enough and substantiated the belief that Moscow is now openly wooing Marshal Tito. But it could not have escaped the dimmest-witted reader of *Pravda* that on the day after the Malenkov-Molotov peace demonstration, the Soviet-sponsored "European Security Conference" opened in Moscow without the presence of Yugoslavia. Or that Marshal Tito failed to send his thanks to the Kremlin but instead embarked on the frigate *Galeb*—The Dove—for a state visit to India and Burma.

The same Radio Belgrade program that announced his departure also declared that the Moscow conference only added tension to international relations, and charged that the Soviet Union "has not done everything possible to reach a compromise solution of European problems, particularly those of Germany and Austria."

As he left for India, the first European chief of state to visit that country since it attained its independence, Marshal Tito emphasized the similarity of "those distant lands" to Yugoslavia in attitude and political development, and besought their collaboration in achieving "peaceful active co-existence." He repeated his remarks when he arrived in New Delhi two weeks later.

At the same time that Tito sailed for Asia, his principal collaborator and most logical successor, Vice President Eduard Kardelj, undertook a European tour to strengthen the Yugoslav Communist Party's associations with the democratic Socialist parties of France, Belgium, Scandinavia and West Germany. On his return to Belgrade he declared that, "History has settled the quarrel between revolutionary and evolutionary socialism; it has approved both." This sequence of events does not mean that Belgrade has brushed off entirely the efforts of the Soviet bloc toward the "normalization" of relations. A Yugoslav economic mission has left for Moscow—on Russian initiative—to turn the present short-term barter agreement into a substantial trade treaty. The mixed Yugoslav-Romanian border commission has resumed its work of liquidating border incidents. The Yugoslavs have amicably taken part in the latest session of the Danube Commission, meeting in Budapest.

Alexander Kendrick, a European correspondent for CBS, was recently transferred from Vienna to London.

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Yugoslav envoys in all the Soviet satellite capitals have engaged to the fullest in diplomatic protocol. In Moscow itself, the Yugoslav ambassador was received by the chairmen of the two branches of the Supreme Soviet, and for an hour, according to Radio Moscow, they "clarified questions concerning the activities of the Supreme Soviet, at his kind request." A group of Yugoslav musicians went to Sofia for a series of concerts. The Czechoslovak football champions *Spartak* journeyed to Zagreb to play the Yugoslav champions *Dynamo*.

THE historic Yugoslav reception in Moscow, which incidentally was attended by the ambassador of Communist China although Yugoslavia has no diplomatic relations with that country, was paralleled throughout the Soviet sphere. In Sofia the festivities were attended by the Bulgarian Premier Vulko Chervenkov, and the official party organ *Rabotnichesko Delo* lauded "the heroic struggle of the Yugoslav people" and declared for the elimination of "anything that could impede the establishment of neighborly relations" with Yugoslavia.

The Yugoslav reception in Bucharest was attended by Romanian Prime Minister Georghiu-Dej, and in Budapest by Hungarian Premier Nagy and the party chief, Mattyas Rakosi. The Yugoslav Ambassador in Romania laid a wreath on the tomb of the Unknown Soldier, and Romanian President Petru Groza sent a congratulatory telegram to "His Excellency Mr. Josef Broz Tito," while the official newspaper *Scanteia* declared that "a deep friendship, based on old traditions and hardened in the common fight for liberty and national independence, ties the Romanian and Yugoslav people."

By contrast, Malenkov and Kruschev failed to attend the holiday reception at the Albanian embassy in Moscow, held the day after the toast to "Comrade Tito," or the reception of the Finnish legation, a week later.

Radio Belgrade accepted all these manifestations of Soviet cordiality "with pleasure," but did not neglect to express the hope that "they are not mere words but a real proof of good will to improve relations."

Another, even more impressive show of Yugoslav caution came when the Russians offered to supply Tito with sufficient grain to make up for a bad harvest, although the Soviet harvest itself was below expectations. The Yugoslavs not only declined, but accepted a counter-offer of wheat from the United States. Tito's chief economic planner, Vukmanovich-Tempo, came back from three weeks in America and Britain with the report that the two Western governments "fully understand" Yugoslavia's food problem, and hinted acceptance of the Yugoslav proposal that short- and medium-term debts be converted into long-term obligations.

Although they are not bound by the conditions of the international ban on the export of strategic materials to the Soviet bloc, the Yugoslavs refused to include metals in the brief barter deals they concluded with Moscow, and have given assurance that the new formal trade agreement now being negotiated will be used primarily to sell manufactured goods and wood products they cannot dispose of to the West.

Thus, in spite of the softened words from the Kremlin, Tito continues to observe the principle that he will not again become dependent upon the Soviet Union in any way. The policy of a "middle position," which does not mean neutrality, not only marks his attitude toward East-West relations, but also underlies his current trip to India and Burma, which are also "middle position" countries.

Even though they are now convinced that Malenkov is sincerely trying to cut loose from the more flagrant aspects of Stalinism, the Yugoslavs cannot forget the six-year boycott imposed upon them by the Kremlin, and their feeling is that if the toast to "Comrade Tito" was genuine, with its implication of Soviet blunder, failure and recantation, the Russian people should have been informed of it.

Similarly, private admissions by Soviet diplomats in their small talk that the Yugoslav system, too, can be regarded as a type of socialism, fail to impress the Yugoslavs so long as they are not reflected in party publications such as *The Communist* or *Questions of Philosophy*.

So a very clear line has been drawn in Belgrade between Moscow's undoubted desire to improve relations as between states, and any possibility of a more fundamental ideological rapprochement.

It is typical that the healing of the breach between Yugoslavia and Italy, after the Trieste settlement, has been given much more attention in Belgrade than any of the peace maneuvers made by the Kremlin.

The signing of an agreement with Italy on the adjustment of mutual problems easily topped the news of the trade mission's departure for Moscow on the same day.

Nor has it been overlooked that Moscow's overtures to the Yugoslavs happen to coincide with the Kremlin's campaign against German rearmament. Tito's men are

Goose-stepping Yugoslav infantry

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afraid of being drawn into an all-Slav crusade against the threat of German militarism, a propaganda appeal which was openly made by *Pravda* on the anniversary of Yugoslav liberation, and which was underscored by a conference on "mutual relations between Slavs" held in Prague the first week in December.

Nevertheless, the Yugoslavs welcome the lessening of tension that the latest Soviet moves have undeniably brought, and the withdrawal of large portions of the satellite armies from their frontiers.

APPARENTLY a military redeployment has been taking place behind the Iron Curtain, and Mr. Molotov's threats of increased Communist forces if the Paris agreements are ratified will presumably mean Soviet concentration on Polish, Czech and East German military arrangements in Central Europe, rather than on Hungarian and Romanian formations on the Yugoslav border. Indeed one of the reasons for the woo-Yugoslavia campaign may well be Russian aversion to responsibilities on two "fronts" at the same time.

Yet despite the easing of defense burdens that "normalization" of relations with both the Soviet bloc and Italy has brought to the Yugoslavs, it is noteworthy that the Yugoslav budget for 1955 contains increased defense expenditures. In fact, more than a half billion dollars, a full 75 percent of the largest budget in Yugoslav history, is earmarked for military purposes. Part of the increase is due to a Yugoslav program for developing its own armaments plants, and the remainder to the joint military necessities of the Balkan Alliance with Greece and Turkey.

It can be concluded that Yugoslavia's commitments to the West have been unaffected by Moscow's peace offensive. As a result of his Balkan ties, Tito is a de facto part of the Western defense structure although he has no formal connection with the NATO as such.

However, it would be unfair to report that the Yugoslavs have not been influenced by the Kremlin's "new look." Tito has several times expressed the belief that important changes have taken place in the Soviet structure since Stalin's death, such as the apparent decentralization of economic planning, the ending of the purge system, slackened control over the satellites, the restoration of some cultural freedom, and increased means of access for foreigners.

The Yugoslavs see these as possible signposts on the road to "democratic socialism," which is the way they describe their own society. Most Yugoslav theorists believe that Malenkov is earnestly engaged in a "noble experiment," although they feel it may have been forced upon him as a result of the excesses of Stalinism.

But whatever happens in the Soviet Union, indeed even if the Kremlin itself should "go Titoist," the Yugoslavs seem firm in the resolve that they will never again be participants in Soviet plans, although as spectators they are interested and might even be sympathetic.

In helping Yugoslavia sustain its independence the West, of course, has acted in its own self interest. At the same time many looked hopefully for the "mellowing" of Tito's regime following his break with Moscow, and saw, in the relaxation of Communist controls and doctrines the long-term assurance of co-operation with the non-Soviet world. Until recently the "mellowing" seemed to accompany Tito's move to associate Yugoslavia with the non-Communist nations. Now his new relationship with Moscow accompanies, if it does not shape, a reversal of recent domestic trends. For regrettably, those members of the Yugoslav Communist Party who recently complained that undemocratic elements have gained control seem to have proved their point. Following the deposition of Tito's heir apparent, Milovan Djilas, Tito's biographer and close friend Vladimir Dedijer has now been suspended from party duties and faces trial on criminal charges of anti-state propaganda.

This development continues the Djilas story since Dedijer was the only prominent party leader to defend the former Vice-President. As with Djilas, personal animosities seem to play some part in the Dedijer case. For if Djilas was guilty in attacking the party bureaucracy and the spirit of totalitarianism in the party newspaper *Borba*, then Dedijer—himself a former *Borba* editor well-known to Western journalists in many capitals—committed an even more heinous crime in assailing party troglodytes and defending himself in the Western press. Commenting on the probable prosecution of Dedijer, Djilas told *New York Times* correspondent Jack Raymond on December 25th that this move "is an attempt to frighten the democratic elements in the party . . . the party itself is in the hands of undemocratic forces."

The internal Yugoslav struggle now once again laid bare is not only between proponents of more "Democratic Socialism" and the vested party interests and defenders of the one-party system. It is also between old line international Communists like Tito, Kardelj and Moshe Pijade and the home-grown, war-created, non-Soviet—indeed basically anti-Soviet—products like Djilas and Dedijer. Historically their chief offense is that they are more Titoist than Tito.

BUT the most disturbing part of the Dedijer case is its external aspect. The Soviet campaign to "normalize relations" with Yugoslavia has been greeted warily by Tito in his official statements. But it seems now to have had its effects among old Moscow-line Communists like Kardelj and Pijade who may believe that Malenkov's repudiation of Stalinist excesses and his toast to "Comrade Tito" open the way to real rapprochement. If because of his Western commitments Tito makes no political or economic concessions to the Kremlin's ardent wooing, he may still have made an ideological concession in the Dedijer case. Further developments can only heighten the significance and perhaps the tragedy of this fascinating story.

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BOOKS & COMMENT

The Complex American Electorate

by Ralph M. Goldman

GIVEN the candidacies of Truman and Dewey in 1948, how did the weeks of campaigning alter the voters' preferences in men and issues? During their busy daily lives, what, if anything, did the voters perceive of Presidential politics? How, if at all, was the voters' attention held by the mass media? Were the voters swayed by the party organizations, the pressure groups, their friends, the propaganda that filled the air?

Studies of voting behavior are always a source of fascination for those who follow closely the politics of popular sovereignty. Unfortunately, certain hucksters, most devotees of the IBM machine, and all disdainers of the popular capacity to participate in political choice invariably grab hold of these studies, ignore the scientific and statistical qualifying phrases, and offer them as "proof" that the voters are merely mechanical pawns to be pushed about by clever combinations of propaganda appeal and personality elixir.

Voting; A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign, by Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee (Chicago; $7.50).

Fortunately, those with a more balanced judgment look with humility upon the complexity of popular voting, examine modestly its components, and offer their findings as objective contributions to the understanding of people behaving in a free society. *Voting*, by Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee, is a study of this kind. Its 323 pages of text and 60 pages of appendices offer a thorough-going analysis of typical American voting behavior in the 1948 Presidential contest between President Truman and Governor Dewey. Just published, the book deals with data collected as long ago as 1948. Yet its relevance to 1952 and 1956 and many quadrenniums thereafter will be difficult to dispute.

The technical approach of the Berelson-Lazarsfeld-McPhee study is of special interest. Most opinion polls simply take a one-shot nation-wide sample of some two or three thousand interviews, usually asking a very limited number of questions. These have all the limitations of plane and static surfaces. The "panel method" used in the *Voting* survey adds the dimension of depth through time. This panel method was developed by the two senior authors, Berelson and Lazarsfeld, in their first study of this kind, *The People's Choice*, published in 1944. The method, new at that time, involved repeated interviewing of the same group of nearly 3,000 voters living in Erie County, Ohio. Some were interviewed once a month from June to November; control groups were reinterviewed at varying intervals.

More than 75 propositions were tested in the Erie County study. A few were newsworthy: (1) It was first learned that from two-thirds to three-fourths of the voters settle on their final presidential vote by the time the national party conventions are over in June or July. (2) Changes in party position *during* the campaign occur less frequently than changes *between* campaigns. (3) Less than 10 percent of the voters change party during a campaign. (4) From late October to election day the gross number of shifts in support back and forth between the parties is from five to ten times larger than the final net change in party support; that is, the changers tend to cancel each other out. (5) Exposure to the campaign converts only a small minority of the voters in a direction opposite to their predispositions. (6) Republican voters prefer newspapers and Democrats radio as sources of information about the campaign.

Since 1940 the panel method has been applied in studies of the 1944, 1948, and 1952 presidential elections; the congressional election of 1950; and two British general elections in 1950 and 1951. *Voting* deals with the 1948 presidential election campaign, although an appendix is devoted to a very useful tabulation of the findings in all these studies as they came to bear upon more than 200 hypotheses regarding electoral behavior. In *Voting*, about a thousand residents of Elmira, New York, were interviewed intensively four times in June, August, October, and November of 1948. Between 50 and 60 questions were put each time.

Elmira was taken as a "typical" American community, a miniature case study of the larger American case. Elmira was a good place to study for several reasons. A moderate-sized urban region of 76,000, Elmira also was subject to many of the growing suburban influences of present-day America. (The study is weak in its rural coverage.) The community was a long-established one, with a record of steady economic expansion and very little boom-and-bust fluctuation. A typical concentration of communication media existed: two daily papers and one Sunday paper, all owned by the Gannett Press; an influx of dailies from New York, Syracuse, and other nearby metropolises; two local radio stations; a semi-monthly labor-sponsored newspaper and a monthly business-sponsored journal. Elmira was industrially diversified, with about 75 industries of various sizes and kinds. About 86 percent of the workers eligible for unionization did belong to unions, most of these organizations being "settled down and nonmilitant." Ethnic minorities were in "normal" numbers. Although nestling in a heavily Republican area of New York state, Elmira was believed to have a "reasonable" political party balance. (The city is only 40 percent Democratic, but it is doubtful that this effected the findings seriously.) In sum, the authors claim that "Elmira contains a sufficiently heterogeneous sample of people and conditions to assure a realistic test of the generalizations advanced in this book."

WHAT are some of the generalizations about the characteristics of voter behavior in the United States? Some findings in this study are new, others are confirmations of old propositions. In the first place, how do most of us get to be Democrats or Republicans? About 75 percent of the first-voters choose the "usual" party affiliation of their fathers and continue to hold this affiliation in later life. About 90 percent of the adult family members living in the same house, if they have made up their minds at all, agree with

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each other on their voting intentions as of late October.

While family is obviously the most important influence upon party preference, so are the social and economic groups into which we are born or move during the course of a lifetime. White native-born Protestants vote Republican more than minority ethnic groups, specifically, Catholic, Italian-Americans, Jews, and Negroes. Young Catholics, however, are more Republican than their elders, and young Protestants more Democratic, while young Jews and Negroes are more Democratic than their elders.

THIS study provides further confirmation of the well-known fact that our "working class" is hardly class conscious except in its basic adherence to the dominant middle-class ideology symbolized by the "American way of life." The unions, it is not surprising to learn, engage in limited and ineffective "political action" because of membership resistance to dictation, leadership misconceptions about what constitutes effective political action, lack of time, money, and experience, and poor channels of political communication between union leaders and their rank-and-file. In this reviewer's opinion, while there are important exceptions to these generalizations about union activity, notably in New Jersey and Michigan, nationally they do apply. The Berelson-Lazarsfeld-McPhee study also found that union people are more Democratic than non-union people of the same social, economic, and occupational types. The study found that other organized groups—lodges, social, religious, business, professional, patriotic, sports, cultural, and the like—are hardly more effective than the unions in "political action" efforts. Such organizations, it may surprise some, do little in the way of intentional political activity but do have an important effect simply by bringing together people of like social position and interests. This tends to reinforce substantially their political predispositions.

The political campaign is presumably the occasion for touching off political predispositions and for pushing uncertainties toward decisive action. An American election, because it occurs at an arbitrarily designated point in time, is "a race against time as well as against the opposition." Election day is the "terminal point for the wavering of voters." The timing of external events and issues and the timing of candidate strategy are vital to the outcome. The artificial deadline, in this reviewer's opinion, happily adds an artificiality to the crisis atmosphere of American campaigning; pity the poor Europeans whose elections occur when their countries are torn by very real and bitter crises. If Elmira was typical, according to the authors, Dewey was sufficiently ahead to win as late as *two weeks before* election day in 1948. If the Republicans had sensed the Truman trend during the last two weeks and taken strong measures against it, Dewey might have won—if election had come *a few weeks later* than it did.

Voting has a few surprises about the influence of parties and the media of communication during a Presidential campaign. The parties and their rank-and-file workers were hardly the vehicles of political combat in Elmira. Party work was not directed toward the joining of political issues at the level of the individual voter. Party work was directed at the more agreeable task of getting out existing strength. Party work *did* stimulate turnout. For analysts of national party convention behavior this is a most significant finding. The Presidential nominee who alienates the party "regulars" at a national convention must reckon with prospective low turnouts in states where the disgruntled organization is well-knit. Eisenhower succeeded in reconciling the "regulars"; Willkie and Dewey failed, with results now well known.

IF the party organizations did not engage in political in-fighting, who did? In 1948 the parties put the main burden of battle upon the candidates themselves. The candidates, however, took quite distinct campaign postures. The expected winner (Dewey) avoided controversy and dealt in unifying generalities. The expected loser (Truman) stressed explicit comparisons between the parties and courted a slug-fest. The media of communications—the newspapers, radio, and magazine (TV was still a tiny beanstalk)—transmitted the impression of combat on to the voters. The media also took a substantial part in the fray. Although there was extensive (about 40 percent of the news items) nonpartisan reporting, Elmira newspaper readers had "almost a two-to-one better chance to find material favorable to Dewey."

The "debate" on the issues hardly contributed to rational self-government, and this is typical of American campaigns. Dewey and Truman "talked past each other" throughout the campaign. The issues provided the candidates with an opportunity to develop a campaign style. Only about one-third of the voters were highly accurate in their perception of where the candidates stood on the issues. Strong party voters tended to see their own candidate's stand on issues as similar to their own and the opponent's stand as dissimilar. These partisans did not see their differences with their own candidate or their similarities to the opponent's views, although these differences and similarities did exist.

EXPOSURE to the communication media was probably the strongest influence in increasing accuracy of perception. Exposure to the mass media also increased voter interest in the election and intensified their feelings in favor of *their own* candidate. (Remember that from two-thirds to three-fourths of the voters make a lasting choice between candidates as soon as the national conventions are over.) The more they were exposed to the campaign through the mass media, the less voters changed their positions and the more they carried their preferences through to election day. Private conversation was used more than the mass media as a source of political argument by those who were undecided in their vote intention.

The undecided vote has, of course, been the major unknown of recent American campaigns. *Voting* probably makes its most incisive findings on the subject of the "independent voter" and his psychological movements during the closing weeks of a campaign. The short-term voter shifts that so often decide close American elections occur out of all proportion among those voters closest to the border line of political disinterest. Only about one-third of Elmira voters, by their own claim, were "greatly" interested in the 1948 election; another third were moderately interested; the last third were not interested at all. As the campaign progressed, those "interested" remained at the one-third level, but there was high turnover among the individuals who made up the third. Given this instability of political interest, the political managers had to continue campaigning with great fury to "keep even" with their losses.

The classic "independent voter" pictured as a highly interested, nonpartisan, and rational judge of men and issues is so rare a bird as to be completely out-

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side the mainstream of American political life. This news will be hard for intellectuals to accept. As the Berelson-Lazarsfeld-McPhee study shows, the campaign itself tends to polarize people at the expense of moderation. There were more voters who *strongly* supported their candidate at the close of the campaign than at the start. But there were also more who moved into a neutral position (undecided or not voting) from positions of *moderate* support of their candidate. The campaign produced among other things an "extreme center" of total withdrawal from the election process.

As the campaign progressed, fewer people expressed an intention to vote. Finally, on election day, fewer people voted than intended to only a few days earlier. People who intended to vote Democratic in late October were less likely to carry out that intention than people who intended to vote Republican. In short, at this time in our political history, the Democratic vote is less decided and less likely to turn out than the Republican.

Two-thirds of the Elmira voters in 1944 stood pat throughout the campaign from June to November in their choice for President. The remaining third consisted of "changers" who wavered between their own party and neutrality (indecision or intention not to vote) and between the parties themselves. Three-fourths of these who were undecided in June returned to their former party on election day. At the end in October only ten percent of the voters remain undecided, nearly all the others having returned to their original party folds.

Most of the last-minute deciders were Democrats, and in 1948 most, responding favorably to the labor-consumer issues raised by Truman, cast their ballots Democratic.

Voting is a technical book. Even social scientists and political managers, regardless of their obvious vested interest in the findings of this research, will hesitate before bucking its propositions and charts. Yet it is essential homework for both specialist groups as well as interested lay political observers. The study advances appreciably the frontier of political analysis opened in *The People's Choice*. It also confronts all of us quite forcefully with the necessity for a basic reorientation in our approaches to the theory and practice of modern democracy. The words of the authors, quoted at length below, state the issue with unmatchable clarity:

> The political philosophy we have inherited . . . has given more consideration to the virtues of the typical citizen of the democracy than to the working of the *system* as a whole. Moreover, when it dealt with the system, it mainly considered the single constitutive institutions of the system, not those general features necessary if the institutions are to work as required. For example, the rule of law, representative government, periodic elections, the party system, and the several freedoms of discussion, press, association, and assembly have all been examined by political philosophers seeking to clarify and to justify the idea of political democracy. But liberal democracy is more than a political system in which individual voters and political institutions operate. For political democracy to survive, other features are required: the intensity of conflict must be limited, the rate of change must be restrained, stability in the social and economic structure must be maintained, a pluralistic social organization must exist, and a basic consensus must bind together the contending parties.

The Innocence and Windows of Children and Childhood

by Delmore Schwartz

COME, let us meditate upon the fate of a little boy who wished to be
Hungarian! Having been moved with his family to a new suburb, having
been sent to a new school, the only Catholic school in the new suburb,
Where all the other children were Hungarian,

He felt very sad and separate on the first day, he felt more and more separated
and isolated
Because all the other boys and girls pitied and were sorry for him since he was not
Hungarian! Hence they pitied and were sorry for him so much they gave him
handsome gifts,
Presents of comic books, marbles and foreign coins, peppermints and candy,
a pistol, and also their devoted sympathy, pity and friendship

Making him sadder still since now he saw how all Hungarians were very kind and
generous, and he was not

Hungarian! Hence he was an immigrant, an alien: he was and he would be,
Forever, no matter what, he could never become Hungarian!
Hungarian! Hence he went home on the first day, bearing his gifts
and telling his parents how much he wished to be
Hungarian: in anguish, in anger,

Accusing them of depriving him, and misusing him: amusing them,
So that he rose to higher fury, shouting and accusing them

—Because of you I am a stranger, monster, orang-outang!
Because of you (his hot tears say) I am an orang-outang! and not
Hungarian! Worse than to have no bicycle, no shoes. . . .

Behold how this poor boy, who wished so passionately to be Hungarian
Suffered and knew the fate of being American.
Whether on Ellis Island, Plymouth Rock,
Or in the secret places of the mind and heart
This is America—as poetry and hope
This is the fame, the game and the names of our fate:
This we must suffer or must celebrate.

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FILMS

WHEN Italian film director Renato Castellani resolved to produce *Romeo and Juliet* in Italy, perhaps he thought of how the sun washes the façade of San Zeno di Maggiore in Verona with running gold. Perhaps he conjured up the awninged vegetable stalls and bronzed marketers in Siena's Piazza del Duomo to witness hot Mercutio's fatal duel with Tybalt. Or perhaps it was the grated confessional in Sommacampagna's bare and awesome twelfth century church that he saw, in which the lovers might touch

Romeo and Juliet (the film version of Renato Castellani).

hands while Friar Laurence pronounced their portentous vows. Or it may have been the image of faded frescoes, cracked plaster, arches eaten by weather . . . or just the bright Italian sun filling a market square.

All of these have been exploited—sensitively and appreciatively—to make a pictorially brilliant film. The lovers sight one another in a sumptuous Renaissance ballroom in Venice: Romeo hears of his banishment before a Fra Angelico in the friar's cell at San Francesco del Deserto on the Venetian lagoon; Capulet and Montague youths fight out their vendetta around a medieval fountain in Tuscany and Romeo climbs Montagnana's walls to reach his beloved; the lovers make their last rendezvous in a crypt whose stone seems streaked with the centuries' weeping.

Castellani has transformed *Romeo and Juliet* into a motion picture—something different from making a film version of the play—and, with a painter's eye for color and form and an Italian's feel for his country's treasures, he has created a motion picture of most extraordinary beauty.

Somehow the play is not the thing, not the whole thing anyway. Unlike Lawrence Olivier, Castellani is a film director first and foremost—even while writing the scenario—and when there is a choice between telling and showing, he invariably favors the latter; his best tool is the camera, his goal the direct visual image.

Castellani adds a scene of Friar John being boarded up in Mantua with a victim of the Plague. He shows us a fair Rosaline and gives her a dozen utilitarian words to speak. He has Romeo frantically smashing a heavy gold candelbra to serve as a crowbar for opening Juliet's tomb instead of simply asking his servant to fetch the tool.

The adaptation is freer than the ones we've been accustomed to from Olivier and the makers of *Julius Caesar*. Not only does Castellani add a speech here and there and do the necessary shifting about of scenes, he omits some of the most quoted of Shakespeare's lines—portions of the balcony scene; Mercutio's vision of Queen Mab; the nurse's rough reflections on life; Juliet's effort to kiss poison from Romeo's lips.

Still, the film runs for something over two hours and the words, even Shakespeare's words, aren't sacrosanct to the movie-maker; though delightfully fanciful, possibly Queen Mab had to go.

But where the words remain they are deserving of more respect than they're always paid here. In his selection of the star-cross'd lovers, the film director has lorded it over the interpreter of Shakespeare. The publicity release has it that Castellani found Susan Shentall, a 19-year-old secretarial student who had never acted professionally, in a London restaurant and was at once impressed by "Susan's gentle countenance, her pale sweet skin and honey-blonde hair." The description is apt but in exchange for the youth and freshness that Juliet gains from this attractive unknown, she loses much of the poetry that Shakespeare gave her. Words rush from Miss Shentall's lips in breathless snatches. If she is free of professional mannerisms she is likewise innocent of the professional's versatility, experience and control. Visually she is superb . . . one may understand why the director chose her, yet regret that he did not hold out for something more.

Laurence Harvey is a professional actor who can recite poetry. But his Romeo is almost all lyricism; force is absent. Even when he kills Paris at Juliet's tomb, his fury is that of a temporarily distracted boy. His Romeo is soft—and certainly much softness is warranted but the role implies spirit that Mr. Harvey (though he looks dashing enough) captures only sporadically. This Romeo's temperament is a willow that bends and bends and bends and somehow never springs back.

It is not surprising then that even with the considerable assets of youth and attractiveness, the couple's love scenes miss real passion. Their first meeting promises emotions which are never released. Youthful infatuation is as high as they soar—although at the best moments it seems quite high. They play with conceits like the teen-agers they are, tender, graceful, light-headed. They are well-matched, always believable . . . but rarely stirring. When they come together, nothing explodes. When they kiss, only the twittering of birds.

In part at least the surroundings themselves—selected with a film director's eye, remember, not an actor's or a playwright's—defeat the pair. The romance of a 16-year-old and a 14-year-old played out within walls that have witnessed generations of man's passion. A five-day interlude watched by so many sad-eyed Madonnas from the dusty corners of so many old churches. A nice young English couple reciting poetry to one another while the people of Verona who spawned the tale of feud and love and murder, who seem still close to the heat of it, go on about their everyday living.

The lesser roles are more vividly conceived—more's the pity that the nurse and Mercutio were so cut. Flora Robson is a foolish, affectionate, immensely human nurse—if not so raw as some have made her. As Friar Laurence, Mervyn Johns manages to be a trifle spinsterish without becoming quaint. Sebastion Cabot's Capulet is a bluff, roaring businessman. And a young Italian newcomer, Aldo Zollo, makes an agile and witty Mercutio. John Gielgud delivers the prologue with all his usual fine style.

But Italy, ardent and aged, is the star . . . and that is Castellani's achievement.

WALTER GOODMAN

Notes on the Critics

RALPH M. GOLDMAN was an editor of the five-volume report of the American Political Science Association on *Presidential Nominating Politics in 1952*. DELMORE SCHWARTZ is at work on a long poem. WALTER GOODMAN is a Washington free-lance writer. ERIC BENTLEY is editing a collection of Bernard Shaw's music criticism for Anchor Books.

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THEATRE

CLIFFORD ODETS' play about Noah is the best American play I have ever reviewed in these columns, and, just in case I am suspected of a preference for European plays, let me add that it knocks André Obey's *Noah* into a cocked hat. For Obey's theatricality, though amiable, is empty; it is Cocteau, as it were, relieved of his dazzle and adjusted to the mild light of ladies' club or junior college. Obey's poetry, though innocuous, has no great meaning; anchored in no recognizable reality, it floats rudderless as the ark itself but without divine guidance.

It can be retorted that Mr. Odets' ark carries all too heavy a freight of meanings. One theme, derived less from Noah than Job, is the humbling of human pride by divine discipline. But this Job is not alone. His youngest son stands up against him and against God and represents a modern point of view: the

The Flowering Peach, by Clifford Odets (Belasco Theatre).

Divine Disciplinarian is too savage for him, he expresses his hope that even God can improve; Mr. Odets has read his Shaw. Then again, what God did with his flood suggests what America or Russia might do with the atom bomb . . . . Granted that no playwright can really handle all this in a single play, one can admire what Mr. Odets has done instead, which is to anchor the ark in a family of Jewish immigrants to the United States. The drama of ideas is only a subplot, and nearly all subplots are rather a nuisance. The main plot is what Freud called a family romance. Mr. Odets' achievement is to have provided an image of a man in his littleness and his largeness, his ugliness and his beauty, amid the circumstances of such a cosmic catastrophe as today seems no fairy tale.

I wouldn't say that even this main part of the play is all of a piece. There is too much about marriage and divorce, or rather Mr. Odets seems to force into his play more about marriage and divorce than—by its own logic—it requires. There are two subjects on which Mr. Odets has always been more an ideologue than an artist: one is politics, the other is sex. In other words, the marital squabbles in *The Flowering Peach* belong, paradoxically, less to the family romance than to that troublesome subplot of ideas. The relationships to which the word Romance applies are those of Noah and his wife and of Noah and his youngest son. It would seem that while Mr. Odets tends to see young lovers (not in this play only) in terms of schmaltz or brutality, for an old man who loves wife and child he can find the very language of the heart.

That is not all. Though the orthodox, Jewish or Christian, may be irritated by the ideas of the subplot, they cannot accuse Mr. Odets of doing what they probably expected him to do: namely, to belittle Noah's faith. If religion is to be found, not in creeds and avowals, but in reverence for life, in humility before the mystery of things, in a man's spontaneous and pervasive spirituality, then this Noah is a religious man; and so is his author. In fact Mr. Odets has shown our fumbling theological playwrights how to put religion—or rather, religiousness—on the stage. The perfect instance and symbol for this is Menasha Skulnik, as Noah, delicately holding a singing mouse (the mythical gitka) in his expressive hands.

Mr. Skulnik is three quarters of the performance, as Noah is three quarters of the play. He stands center stage—figuratively and often literally—and we, like the actors, sit at his feet while in a voice that nature meant to be ugly—a bassoon played by a Marx Brother—he beautifully tells us, as he phrases it, "a mystery." We have here the gentlest of actors, and one of the best. No such Atlas has carried a playwright's world on his shoulders since Lee Cobb worked for Arthur Miller. But, while Cobb grunted, groaned, and screamed at the weight, Mr. Skulnik roars as gently as any sucking dove, as sweetly as any nightingale. Of all our actors, he is the finest in repose, his modesty has most dignity, his smallness the largest largeness. He sits there, shoulders drooping, hands folded, knees together, toes turned slightly in—or he stands and shambles across the deck with his pants sagging from his backside and bunched up over his shoes—and the stage is lit as brightly as by . . . but why compare Mr. Skulnik to his inferiors? Let me remark, inadequately, that it is a wonderfully quiet and slow-moving play, and that Mr. Skulnik demonstrates what the Broadway public may be loth to believe; that drama, like music, need not be either loud or fast.

I left the theatre in a glow of pleasure. And the source of the pleasure? In some degree, it is just that a play has been *written*—that is to say, set down in living language. In American drama especially, the note of living language is seldom struck. It is heard for an hour or so in *Anna Christie*. It is heard in certain scenes of Tennessee Williams—when, for example, the mother speaks in *Glass Menagerie* or Blanche in *Streetcar*. Yet Clifford Odets suggests comparison less with these compatriots than with two European contemporaries—Sean O'Casey and Eduardo De Filippo. These three poets of the urban masses are subject to similar temptations (especially the temptation of Big Ideas) while their real talent is all, as it were, on the wrong side of the tracks. In the thirties, Mr. Odets was admired as the Voice of Protest. That no longer seems such a great thing to be. *Awake and Sing* has been admired, too, for the accuracy of its idiom. But this is the merit of the parrot and the tape recorder. The real merit of this author, as of O'Casey and De Filippo, is a matter of the *imaginative use* of dialect, which in turn is a matter of the poet's inner identification with the people who speak that dialect.

When I call these writers poets, I have only one poetic genre in mind; the poetry of the theatre, a poetry of the spoken and acted word, the word held up to the light to be stared at by a crowd, the word flung across footlights by actor-marksmen aiming straight at the heart of an audience. And I have in mind that when Mr. Odets' plays were presented in London during the Marxist decade one critic dared to question the reality in Mr. Odets' realism. "Practically every scene is jazzed up, given more punch and excitement and noise than it should have, without reference to reality at all." If he had added "and a good thing too," I should agree with him. Not that I want to defend "noise," which, for that matter, Mr. Odets, in his new play, does without. But there was always more jazz and punch in Mr. Odets than there was "socialist realism," less of Karl, than of Harpo, Marx. All of which is to repeat that he is a poet and of the theatre.

ERIC BENTLEY

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CORRESPONDENCE

► Jews and Revolutions

SIRS:

In his review of Judd L. Teller's book *Scapegoat of Revolution* (*NR*, December 13) Mr. Maurice J. Goldbloom implied that Zionists maintain that "the Zionist goal of a specifically Jewish salvation" is premised on the principle "that the Jews can be saved if the world is not." Mr. Goldbloom's definition of Zionism is something not even remotely related to its doctrine. Zionism has never separated the fate of the Jews from the fate of humanity. . . . It has always been the Zionist contention that the fate of the Jews everywhere is joined to the fate of democracy and that the extinction of freedom would draw the blinds over Jewish survival.

ROSE L. HALPRIN

New York City

• • •

SIRS:

Mr. Goldbloom's statement that . . . "Jews were and are far more numerous in radical groups proportionately than most other sections of the population in the countries where they live" is an assumption that is yet to be statistically borne out. The fact is that in the 1880's, a time of darkest oppression for the Jews in Czarist Russia, they formed barely more than four percent of the radical movements, corresponding to their ratio in the population. In America, in the Civil War for example, the number of extremists—Jewish Abolitionists and slaveholders—was small, while the majority were Unionists. This applies in our day as well. Also, this small percentage is composed largely of persons who share no affirmative Jewish group ties, however much Mr. Goldbloom might claim for them a Prophetic tradition.

HYMAN A. SCHULSON

New York City

► Pornographic Politics

SIRS:

There are so many people I would rather quarrel with than another reader of the *New Republic*. However, I cannot let Mr. Levine's very determined misunderstanding of my letter of December 13 pass.

By deleting a phrase from one of my sentences, which he quotes, Mr. Levine leaves the impression that I condone, or at least ignore, the Communist betrayal of many of the causes which they have taken up, or taken over from others. In fact, I said, "Even after fifteen years of watching the Communists exploit and betray liberal movements, I would, etc." Could this be plainer?

My thought was, and is, that in circumstances, such as those of 1938 (not 1942 when Japanese bombs had blasted even the "majority of Americans" into an anti-Nazi attitude), one may feel obliged for tactical reasons to accept allies as and where one finds them.

As for Mr. Levine's description of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact of 1939 as "lewd," I agree. However, if we are to enter into the comparative pornography of contemporary political events, I must say that I find the utterly unnecessary rearmament of a people whose late government not ten years ago was engaged in the systematic extermination of five million helpless human beings no more edifying.

J. F. GOLAY

Bad Godesberg, Germany

► Liberalism and the Young

SIRS:

I have just finished reading your special fortieth anniversary issue from cover to cover. It is a fine present to your readers and one that we shall keep to read again. Thank you.

I was at first puzzled by your selection of material because some of it is so very good and obviously the author at his very best and other pieces are not so good. But now I think I understand why.

Of course you would reprint "For a Declaration of War" for no one could resist the opportunity to gloat over past foresight, even if one so desired. Any magazine would do it. But not any old magazine would also take this time to muse publicly over past sins and lack of foresight, and remind readers who might well have forgotten (or tell new readers who never knew) of ancient editorial errors and even painfully recite the sins as recent as 1948. I cannot conceive the *Post* doing it. This is why I like the *New Republic* and am compelled to tell you so immediately.

I am young — twenty-five—one of the generation of whom you write and in whom you seem to have faith. I believe much of what you say of us is true. We were born in depression and spent our adolescence in war and reached our majority in another war. If we missed losing a brother or a good friend in the real war, we, like me, lost a husband in the war that wasn't a war or at least lost something along the way. I think we are in general a pretty practical lot. Some of us never had any "days of dareless rapture" to put behind, and a lot more of us who did have have since had something happen to make us reappraise our standards of values. We are resigned to the compromise but we are not passive. We accept the security regulations as a necessary evil (have we ever known a time when they were absent since we have become aware?) but we are intensely jealous of the rights we still possess, aware as I never thought possible of the true meaning and value of freedom, and ready to fight with passion to keep it. Our heroes are Adlai Stevenson and Elmer Davis and Max Ascoli. We have not yet spoken very loudly, for many are afraid. And in some the "silent opinion" is as yet unformed. But we are present and we shall be heard.

JACQUELINE BLACKFORD

Berkeley, California

The New Republic welcomes communications from its readers in regard to subjects of current interest. Those of 300 words or less lend themselves to publication more readily than longer letters.

► How Strato Is Your Streak?

SIRS:

"How Strato Is Your Streak?" (*NR*, December 13) should be required reading for car manufacturers and buyers. The current crop of "metal in motion," "futuramic" ideas of the designers plus the advertising men certainly hit the nail on the thumb.

H. C. ELSTON

Davenport, Iowa

• • •

SIRS:

In reply to Robert F. Kimball's letter criticizing the article *How Strato Is Your Streak?* it is obvious that Mr. Kimball is in an ivory tower regarding the blunt purpose of much of advertising today. In a field as competitive as re-

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tailing new automobiles, agencies sell as hard as they can via smooth words, mink-clothed models, and dazzling photographs of cars.

I bought a 1954 car 4 months ago and looked upon it as just another means of transportation after owning it for 3 weeks. I bought a two-door car because I have small children. I just hope that GM, Ford, *et al*, figure out a way of preventing me from being impaled on the steering wheel if I must stop short or some fool drunk plows into me.

The public wants and needs safety features in new cars to reduce the toll of 40,000 killed every year. Have you noticed the emphasis on safety in new cars in recent advertising? I haven't.

LARRY GOULD

Euclid, Ohio

► Mr. Bentley Regrets

SIRS:

My harsh words about Miss Nancy Kelly (*NR*, Dec. 27) were followed by a very important admission which must have got lost in your Christmas shopping, as you did not print it. It read: "But this is the first time I have seen Miss Kelly; undoubtedly I have not yet seen what she is capable of." In fairness to the actress, I request that you print this note.

ERIC BENTLEY

New York City

► Ivy League Tuitions

SIRS:

One of our Ivy League Colleges has recently announced a $200 increase in tuition fees to take effect next Autumn.

No doubt many families are well enough off to pay it without a murmur. What of the others who have scratched the bottom of the barrel for years that they might give their sons the precious four years which is gradually becoming a must for the ambitious young man who will be on his own after graduation.

I have in mind a family that managed to get their two sons admitted a year ago by thrift and sacrifice, have arranged a budget for the next years to carry the boys through by the skin of their teeth and learn now that they must raise an extra $400 a year or quit.

For such a family (and no doubt there are plenty such) it will be a heavy burden.

Is it fair to offer a four-year course for a certain sum per year and increase it in mid-term, changing the rules so to speak after the kick off?

ALPHONSUS J. MURPHY

Portland, Maine

► The Nature of Prejudice

SIRS:

Charles Angoff, in his review of Gordon Allport's *The Nature of Prejudice* (*NR*, January 3), makes speculations about "unconscious" feelings of prejudice existing in Arnold Toynbee, as well as in other "intellectuals" described but not named. Consequently I consider Mr. Angoff himself fair game as an object for similar speculations.

It seems to me that Mr. Angoff is himself a victim of his own prejudice, that he seems to possess anti-Gentile feelings of which he is unaware, or partly unaware, and which are bound up with his understandable horror of anti-Semitism. . . .

Political anti-Semitism, as Mr. Angoff points out, is capable of suddenly erupting, with the most tragic consequences. Anti-Gentile feelings, being confined to a minority in this country, do not have the same powerful roots on which to feed as does anti-Semitism and hence are not as politically dangerous. But they have personal roots. And any individual seeking truth needs to struggle with the disease within him, whether it takes the form of hostility toward Jewish people or hostility toward Gentiles or of any other kind of prejudice. The terrible fact of political and social anti-Semitism should not serve as an excuse for the personal (and sometimes social) fact of anti-Gentile feelings, even if the first may be partly responsible for the second.

EUGENE KRAMER

Chicago, Illinois

BANDWAGON

SECRETARY OF INTERIOR McKay, back in his home state for the holidays . . . said that after nearly two years in office he generally can ignore political criticism, but that he still was trying to get his wife to adopt his philosophy:

"I tell her that when she goes to bed she should just say her prayers, tell everybody to go to hell, and then go to sleep, as I do."—Salem, Oregon, *Statesman*. December 30, 1954.

MR. HARRIMAN, heir to his father's railroad fortune, hardly could have emphasized more dramatically than by his choice of a week-end home his transformation from a Wall Street financier to a New Deal Democrat.

In contrast to the splendor and magnificence he enjoyed as a boy and a young man in the medieval castle, life for Mr. Harriman and his wife will be simple and informal in the cottage below, near the stables that still house ten of his riding horses.—*New York Times*, December 30, 1954.

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Logan Pearsall Smith
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